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The Apotheosis of the Rentier:
How Napoleonic War Finance
Kick-Started the Industrial
Revolution
Martin Hutchinson and Kevin Dowd
[T]his state of affairs . . . would mean the euthanasia of the
rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative
oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of
capital. . . . I see, therefore, the rentier aspect of capitalism as a
transitional phase which will disappear when it has done its work.
John Maynard Keynes ([1936] 1977: 375–76)
The development of Britain’s economy in the years following the
end of the Napoleonic Wars was heavily influenced by the peculiar
nature of British government wartime finance. Instead of issuing
bonds with higher coupons as interest rates rose, which governments
normally did in wartime, British governments from the 1750s onward
relied mostly on 3 percent “Consols”, i.e., perpetual bonds with a
3 percent coupon issued at deep discounts. In a world in which equity
markets were almost nonexistent and in which there was a gigantic
government bond market swollen by war financing, fluctuations in
the prices of Consols caused swings in investor wealth that had major
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economic effects, which have been much underappreciated. After a
positive wealth effect in the postwar 1780s and a negative one in the
late 1790s, the large, long-lasting bond price increase after 1813
played a major role in capitalizing the Industrial Revolution’s final
take-off and the acceleration of economic growth to near-modern lev-
els. As JeffreyWilliamson (1984: 688) noted when discussing the slow
start to the Industrial Revolution, “Somewhere around the 1820s
Britain passed through a secular turning point.” In this article, we
argue that the key to that turning point was the massive wealth effect
of the postwar increase in Consols’ prices.
The Napoleonic Wars’ Financing Mechanism
Normally, when a government wants to borrow to finance a war,
it knows that its borrowing will cause interest rates to rise, especially
if there is inflation. For example, if peacetime interest rates are about
3 percent, the government might issue a 5 percent bond of 20-year
maturity rather than say the usual 3 percent peacetime bond. When
the bond matures 20 years later and peace reigns again, the govern-
ment can refinance the bond at 3 percent. Investors holding the
5 percent bond receive a higher interest rate, but no capital gain if
they hold the bond to maturity and only a modest gain if they sell
mid-term at a premium while bond prices are higher than normal.
That approach broadly describes how the U.S. wars in Korea
and Vietnam were financed, as well as both U.S. and British con-
tributions to the two world wars. Earlier, the U.K. government had
used a similar approach to finance the War of the Spanish
Succession (1702–13), mostly at interest rates of 8–10 percent and
with heavy use of tontines and lotteries.
The U.K. government adopted a different approach with its next
major wars. In 1751, Sampson Gideon, a brilliant Jewish-British fin-
ancier, persuaded Prime Minister Henry Pelham to convert most of
the outstanding British government debt into 3 percent
Consolidated Annuities (the famous Consols). Until their ill-advised
redemption in 2015, these were perpetual—that is, they had an infi-
nite maturity—and paid 3 percent interest each year.1 When the
1The securities issued in the 1751 refinancing paid 3.5 percent interest for the first
six years, then 3 percent from 1757. There was a further refinancing in 1888, car-
ried out by Chancellor of the Exchequer George Joachim Goschen, into new secu-
rities paying 2.75 percent from 1888 to 1903, then 2.5 percent thereafter. Thus, the
classic “3 percent Consols” existed without refinancing from 1757 to 1888.
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government wanted to finance a war, instead of issuing 5 percent
bonds at par, it issued 3 percent Consols at perhaps 60 percent of
the “par” principal amount, which would then yield 5 percent (i.e.,
3 percent/60 percent) on a running yield basis.
Gideon’s thinking was as follows: since all wars were temporary,
people who bought 3 percent bonds at 60 percent would make gen-
erous 5 percent yields during the war and would then make a large
capital gain afterwards, when yields dropped to 3 percent and the
bonds went back to par. The Consols were therefore an attractive
investment. The government could then find buyers even in war
years, provided (as was the case) that there was confidence that
Britain would later repay its debts in full.
Not only did investors enjoy strong yields, but they also made big
capital gains when peace came: 21 percentage points in six years
after the bottom in 1762 as the Seven Years Wars (1756–63) drew
to an end, and 33 percentage points in 10 years after the wartime
bottom in 1782, as the American War of Independence (1775–82)
drew to an end.2
There was then strong demand for new issues of Consols through-
out themajor wars over the course of the following 50-plus years—the
Seven Years War, the American Wars, and the French Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815, with short remissions).
The Consols enabled Britain to finance heavy military expendi-
tures when its rival France, which had no such mechanism, was
unable to do so without financially crippling itself. Gideon’s clever
structure, which gave windfall profits at the end of each war to
inventory-holding bond dealers like himself, was central to Britain’s
acquiring its empire and to not losing it again after the American
colonies broke away.
The disadvantage of Gideon’s structure from the fiscal point of
view was that, for each £100 of war expenditure on 3 percent Consols
issued at 60 percent of par, £167 was typically added to the debt. But
since the debt was perpetual and never needed to be redeemed, this
feature of Consols finance was not regarded as a major fiscal disad-
vantage. Lord North, chancellor of the exchequer from 1767 to 1782
and prime minister through the American War of Independence,
2Homer and Sylla (2005: 57 for 1752–99; 192 for 1800–27). We take the Homer–
Sylla estimate of annual average prices as the basis for these calculations.
658
Cato Journal
liked the structure because “it was the interest that the people were
burdened with the paying of and not the capital.”3
The interest cost was indeed the same, or even slightly lower than
through issuing new 5–6 percent debt at par, because the Consols’
attractiveness to speculators allowed them to be sold at a slightly
lower running yield. However, over the course of the century after
peace returned in 1815, Britain’s outstanding debt would decline
only to £650 million in 1914, although the growth in the British econ-
omy meant that debt represented only 30 percent of GDP compared
to a peak of around 260 percent of GDP in 1819.
The rise in the prices of British Consols from 1813 onward
appears to have been due, in part, to a reduction in their perceived
risk as the Allies approached France and peace returned, and, in
part, to a drastic reduction in the annual supply of new Consols
through budget deficit financing.4
Table 1 shows gross public income and expenditure for the
years 1812–27, with the surplus or deficit; it also shows the funded
and unfunded debt outstanding at the start of each year, and the
increase in debt during the year.5
The deficit figures and debt increase figures in Table 1 do not tally
because of the timing of government payments and debt financings.
For example, the 1814 military campaign was largely financed by a
£22 million debt issue (increasing the amount of 3 percent debt out-
standing by £38.9 million) on the morning of the supplementary
Budget of November 15, 1813. Nevertheless, the overall trend
3Quoted in The Economist, “Percents and Sensibility,” December 20, 2005.
4A more elaborate explanation might go as follows. The prices of Consols surged
primarily because of a decline in supply as the Napoleonic Wars ended and the
government moved toward fiscal surplus. Moreover, because Consols were
almost the only store of liquid wealth, their price rise would have made investors
wealthier—thereby creating an even greater demand for Consols. It is notewor-
thy that the two main investments available to the rich were Consols and land, but
land became much less profitable after 1815 as grain prices declined. Stocks and
bonds were relatively unimportant (though a small foreign bond market arose in
the 1820s), while direct investment in companies was risky, illiquid, and poorly
diffused among the investing public.
In loanable funds terms, the primary driving factor in the market for
Consols—the decline in supply—would correspond to a reduced demand by the
government for loanable funds.
5The debt figure jumps in 1818 because of the inclusion of Irish government debt
from that year onward.
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TABLE 1
Budget Position and Debt Changes, 1812–27
Gross Public Surplus/ Start of Year Debt Funded Debt
Year Income Expend. Deficit Funded Unfunded Increase
1812 70.3 94.8 ^24.5 583.4 42.6 24.1
1813 74.7 111.1 ^36.4 607.5 44.8 70.0
1814 77.9 112.9 ^35.0 677.5 48.1 7.1
1815 79.1 99.5 ^20.4 684.6 60.3 49.0
1816 69.2 71.3 ^2.1 733.6 44.7 ^17.3
1817 57.6 58.7 ^1.1 716.3 49.8 —
1818 59.5 57.6 1.9 780.6 62.6 15.0
1819 58.1 57.5 0.6 795.6 48.7 2.9
1820 59.9 58.4 1.5 798.5 41.6 6.4
1821 61.6 58.4 3.2 804.9 33.3 ^6.4
1822 59.9 56.5 3.4 798.5 32.7 ^1.1
1823 58.5 54.3 4.2 797.4 38.7 ^4.5
1824 59.7 55.5 4.2 792.9 35.8 ^10.6
1825 57.7 54.1 3.6 782.3 37.9 ^3.0
1826 55.2 56.1 ^0.9 779.3 31.7 5.7
1827 54.7 55.9 ^1.2 785.0 25.0 —
Notes: All units are in £m. Figures from 1818 onward include Irish
debt. Fiscal year-end was January 5 during this period, so figures are for
January 6 of the year concerned to January 5 of the following year.
Source: Mitchell (2011), Tables Public Finance 3 (Income: 581),
Public Finance 4 (Expenditure: 587), and Public Finance 7 (Debt: 601).
6There is, thus, the following implied counterfactual. Reduced supply of Consols,
itself associated with a move toward fiscal surplus, combined with increased
demand for them and the anticipated then actual resumption of specie payments
at the old parity to create a secular decline in interest rates. Falling yields also
suggest that, contrary to Ashton (1948) or Williamson (1984), fiscal crowding out
was no longer an issue by this period.
is clear: huge deficits and increases in the supply of Consols during
the war years of 1812–15 were followed by near-balanced budgets in
1816–19 and surpluses thereafter, while the supply of Consols
stopped increasing from 1816 onward, except for a modest blip in
1819–20 caused by funding £10 million of the Bank of England’s
holdings of Exchequer Bills in connection with the return to gold.6
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Table 2 sets out the £823 million of British and Irish govern-
ment funded and unfunded debt that was held by the public on
February 1, 1817, a date chosen so the special “emergency” financ-
ings for the Waterloo campaign were out of the way.
By far the greatest part of the outstanding debt, £562 million or
68 percent of the total, consisted of perpetual securities bearing a
3 percent interest rate, payable twice yearly. The largest single
tranche, £384 million, consisted of “Consolidated Annuities,” the
3 percent Consols, which paid interest in January and July. There
was also an exactly equivalent obligation, the Reduced Annuities,
with principal amount of £148 million, which differed from
Consols only in paying interest in April and October. Dealers would
arbitrage between these two securities, with the Reduced Annuities
generally trading at a small discount (subject to fluctuations before
and after their interest payment dates) because of their somewhat
lesser liquidity. There were also two relatively small older issues with
TABLE 2
Funded and Unfunded British Government Debt,
February 1, 1817
Held by Public Held in Sinking
Security £′000 Fund £′000
Bank of England Annuities 1726 15,686 1
South Sea Old and New Annuities 1791 14,346 6,692
Consolidated Annuities 383,708 18,370
Reduced Annuities 148,164 36,852
Total 3 Percent Debt 561,905 61,914
Consolidated Annuities at £4 Percent 74,919 16
Consolidated Annuities at £5 Percent 134,882 18
Annuities, 1797 and 1802 1,059 5
Total 4 Percent and 5 Percent Debt 210,860 39
Total Funded Debt 772,765 61,953
Unfunded Debt, Exchequer Bills 44,650 —
Unfunded Treasury and Other Bills 5,397 —
Total Unfunded Short-Term Debt 50,047 —
Total Debt 822,812 61,953
Source: Hansard (1817).
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3 percent coupons, reflecting refinancings of debt incurred early in
the 18th century, for the Bank of England and the South Sea
Company, of £16 million and £14 million, respectively.
In addition to the perpetual 3 percent debt, there was
£211 million of 4 percent and 5 percent debt, which would be
refinanced after the war as interest rates declined. The 4 percent
debt, totaling £75 million, took the form of 4 percent Consols,
while the 5 percent debt, totaling £136 million, originally con-
tracted in many cases by the Navy and Army directly, had been
consolidated into 5 percent Consols. By the 1820s, the 5 percent
debt was trading above par. There were then two refinancing
operations carried out at the end of 1823 and in early 1824, one
converting £135 million of 5 percent Consols into 4 percent
Consols and the second converting £80 million of 4 percent
Consols into a new issue of 3.5 percent Consols.7
Finally, in 1817 there was £50 million of short-term debt, mostly
in the form of Exchequer Bills, which were short-term instru-
ments, generally converted into long-term debt as new issues were
undertaken. The £50 million outstanding in February 1817 was
high by historical standards, a residue of the emergency financings
undertaken at the Napoleonic Wars’ climax in 1813–15, and was
over the next few years reduced by being converted into long-term
debt. Reducing the amount of Exchequer Bills outstanding,
thereby mopping up excess market liquidity, was an important pre-
condition for the subsequent return to the gold standard.
In addition to the £822 million of debt held by the public, the
government had since 1786 built up a sinking fund, intended to
accrue at compound interest and allow the debt to be redeemed
within 45 years. This fund had been established by William Pitt the
Younger because redeeming debt at par, under Gideon’s struc-
ture, was expensive and the sinking fund allowed other debt to be
redeemed through market purchases. Payments had been made
into the sinking fund throughout the war years, even though the
government was running deficits, on the principle that the gradual
accrual of the sinking fund, with each new issue of debt having an
amortization provision to be paid into the sinking fund, would
7This, and much other useful information about British government financing in
1815–25, is set out in Neal (1998).
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reassure the nation’s creditors. By February 1817 the sinking fund
totaled £62 million. It would be modified in 1819 and eliminated
in stages in the early 1820s, with the government debt it purchased
being canceled in the process.
As an example of how war finance was structured, we can exam-
ine the last major financing undertaken during the Napoleonic Wars,
which was also the largest single tranche undertaken, and which was
announced by Chancellor of the Exchequer Nicholas Vansittart to
the House of Commons on June 14, 1815, four days before the
Battle of Waterloo, and had been completed that morning. The loan
raised £27 million in net proceeds, for each £100 of which buyers
would be given £130 in 3 percent reduced stock, £10 in 4 percent
Consols, and £44 in 3 percent Consols. The £27 million of net pro-
ceeds was obtained by issuing a total of £49.68 million principal
amount of new debt, at a running interest cost of 5.62 percent and
an average issue price of 54.35 percent of par. In addition to the
interest payable, a sinking fund provision of 2.81 percent was made
on the £27 million raised, for a total annual debt service charge of
8.43 percent.8
Vansittart told the House of Commons that this record-sized
issue, the pricing of which was determined by negotiated tender and
not by competitive bid, was only just fully subscribed; a great
proportion of the issue was initially left with the underwriters.
Four days later the Battle of Waterloo took place, news of which was
received on the late evening of June 21.
Contrary to widespread belief, there was no great immediate
“bounce” in the market by which (in separate legends) Nathan
Rothschild and the broker/economist David Ricardo were both
supposed to have made £1 million each through trading on early
(and, effectively, inside) information of the battle. However, given
the price rise in Consols over the next decade, their holdings of
this issue alone played a major role in generating the Rothschild
and Ricardo fortunes.
As anticipated by Gideon 60 years earlier, City of London fin-
anciers did well from the postwar surges in bond prices. It is no
coincidence that Rothschilds, led by Nathan Meyer Rothschild,
and Barings, led by the second-generation Alexander Baring,
became very powerful after 1815. Their capital base dramatically
8Vansittart’s budget is contained in Hansard (1815: cols 795–822, June 14).
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increased, from 1810 or so as their large long positions in Consols
rose in value. Ricardo also became very rich by the same dynamic.
Postwar Surge in Consol Prices Causes
Rentier Apotheosis
The deep discount debt issuance structure had major implica-
tions for the post–Napoleonic War economy because the volume
of debt was so large, both in absolute terms and in relation to other
assets in the economy:
• Britain’s debt-to-GDP ratio, at the peak in 1819, was about
260 percent, the highest of any country anywhere that has
been successfully paid down— slightly higher than Britain in
1945. Of course, Britain had not borrowed 260 percent of
1819 GDP to fight its wars, but only about 170 percent in
cash terms.
• Nearly all the Napoleonic War debt was issued around
60 percent of par or below, so when peace came holders
would have a capital gain of 40 percent as Consols trended
back toward par. Consol prices did not return to par quickly,
however. They reached 77.5 percent in 1818 and almost
91 percent in 1824 at the peak of the boom (see Table 3).
They were not to hit par until the 1840s.
More precisely, there was a total of £562 million of 3 percent
debt outstanding on February 1, 1817, in the month preceding which
Consols’ average yield had been 4.72 percent, for a price of
63.6 percent (ignoring accrued interest), with holders having already
enjoyed a 7 percentage point price appreciation since the recent low
of August 1815. By April 1824, Consols’ yield had dropped to
3.16 percent, so the price had risen to 94.9 percent. In the period
between August 1815 and April 1824, holders of 3 percent Consols
enjoyed a capital profit of 38.3 percentage points, or a total of
£215 million on the £562 million of 1817’s 3 percent debt. An addi-
tional profit of perhaps £10 million would have been received on
the £75 million of 4 percent Consols, as their price rose toward
and above par. Total profits to Consols holders over this period
would then have been around 75 percent of GDP, equivalent to a
profit of $14 trillion in current U.S. dollars. In addition, investors’
1824 pounds were worth around 20–30 percent more than their
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1815 pounds had been based on any of the Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz
price series, the Rousseaux price series, or the Lindert and
Williamson “best guess” cost of living index (Mitchell 2011: 721–22,
737). Taking the annual figures for 1815 and 1824, these give a
deflationary rise in value of 28 percent, 25 percent, and 18 percent,
TABLE 3
Average Price of Consolidated 3 Percent Annuities,
1752–1829
Average Average Average
Year Consols’ Price Year Consols’ Price Year Consols’ Price
(£) (£) (£)
1752 105.00 1778 66.50 1804 56.62
1753 104.88 1779 61.50 1805 59.50
1754 103.06 1780 61.50 1806 61.63
1755 95.50 1781 57.50 1807 61.00
1756 89.00 1782 57.00 1808 65.94
1757 88.50 1783 63.00 1809 66.81
1758 93.44 1784 55.43 1810 67.13
1759 83.56 1785 63.00 1811 64.25
1760 79.44 1786 74.00 1812 59.00
1761 76.94 1787 73.50 1813 61.00
1762 69.94 1788 74.00 1814 61.00
1763 89.00 1789 76.50 1815 67.00
1764 83.13 1790 76.87 1816 59.75
1765 88.00 1791 83.75 1817 73.19
1766 88.50 1792 90.00 1818 77.50
1767 89.00 1793 75.75 1819 71.94
1768 90.63 1794 68.19 1820 67.88
1769 86.44 1795 66.38 1821 73.75
1770 82.38 1796 62.50 1822 79.13
1771 84.50 1797 50.81 1823 78.94
1772 90.94 1798 50.50 1824 90.94
1773 86.43 1799 59.19 1825 84.75
1774 87.43 1800 63.69 1826 79.13
1775 88.50 1801 61.00 1827 83.13
1776 85.50 1802 70.94 1828 84.75
1777 77.94 1803 60.13 1829 89.81
Source: Homer and Sylla (2005: 157 for 1752–99; 192 for 1800–27).
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respectively, primarily due to the resumption of gold payments in
1819–21.
One might say that this wealth was mostly brand new. Investors
in August 1815 had put in only 57 percent for their 3 percent
Consols and within a few years received a profit of 37 percentage
points in capital gains plus interest at around 5 percent per annum
on their initial investment. This profit was tax-free after the
income tax had been abolished in 1816, and in any case capital
gains had been untaxed. The capital gain was also permanent: once
Consols had risen back to peacetime levels in the early 1820s, they
fluctuated only moderately and indeed rose further until their
price peaked late in the century.
Consequently, there was some 60 percent (from 1817) to
75 percent (from 1815) of GDP of new liquid capital in the early
1820s economy. In the early 1820s, this new money financed not
only a number of subprime South American governments but also
innumerable new factories and inventions that became the back-
bone of the Industrial Revolution.
Previous Periods of Rentier Enrichment and
Impoverishment
It is interesting to observe that the same effect had occurred in the
opposite direction in the 1790s. The price of Consols dropped from
an average of 90 in 1792 to below 51 in 1797 and 1798. Since the
nominal value of government debt in 1792 was about 120 percent of
1792 GDP, this fall caused a capital loss of about 47 percent of GDP
in the first five years of the war.
Both Liverpool, the future prime minister (in 1796), and his
father Charles Jenkinson (in 1798) wrote pamphlets proclaiming
that Britain’s wartime economy was prospering, based on a sub-
stantial rise in exports and output over those years. However, the
impoverishment of many savers during those years and the capital
losses suffered by banks and other financial institutions starved the
economy of capital. This latter point explains why Pitt in the 1790s
had much more difficulty raising the necessary war finance than
Perceval, Liverpool, and Vansittart did after 1807, and was a con-
tributory factor to Britain’s going off gold in 1797.
One can trace this Consols’ wealth effect back further; Pitt’s
benign economic conditions and growth in the 1780s were
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largely caused by a rise in Consols’ prices from £55 to £90
between 1784 and 1792.
It is clear that, owing to Gideon’s financing technique, the size
of the government bond market, and its importance in the national
economy, the “wealth effect” of fluctuations in bond prices far
exceeded any Keynesian stimulus from wartime spending.
Consols in the Context of Overall Wealth Holding
Government bonds were only one of the forms in which wealth
was held in the years after 1815. However, unlike other wealth
they were highly liquid, and indeed were the only security quoted
on the stock exchange from its founding in 1801 until 1822. Over
the course of the 18th century, government securities (“the
funds”) and Consols in particular had become the principal non-
landed form of wealth holding for merchants and the middle class,
who tended to be more liquid than all but the richest aristocracy.
Nevertheless, agricultural land and to an increasing extent
urban real estate remained an important component of British
elite fortunes. Such forms of wealth storage as gold and silver plate
had declined in importance since the 17th century as banks had
proliferated, while bank deposits and insurance policies had
appeared and at lower levels of wealth the savings bank movement
was beginning its long 19th century climb.
The most important form in which wealth was held was still land,
though its importance was beginning to decline during this period as
mercantile relative wealth increased and landowners diversified
their wealth into Consols. Prices of land had enjoyed a massive
boom during the Napoleonic Wars, as corn prices had soared from
an average of 43 shillings per quarter in 1794 to 127 shillings per
quarter in the dearth year of 1812 (Mitchell 2011: 756). Then from
1813 to 1822 corn prices fell, bottoming out at 45 shillings per quar-
ter in 1822 in spite of the 1815 Corn Laws, which had banned
imports when the price was below 80 shillings. Jean-Baptiste Say,
visiting England in late 1814, commented on the extraordinary prof-
its made by agriculturalists during the war, and on their large invest-
ments both in bringing marginal land into cultivation and in
mechanizing and up-scaling their operations (Say 1815).
Some of the landowner wealth acquired during the war was
redeployed into industrialization, both during the war and in the
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years after, partly because the profitability of agricultural land
declined after the war and did not recover for several decades.9
Consider the case of John Crichton-Stuart, 2nd Marquess of
Bute (1793–1848). In 1814, he inherited a very large and liquid
landed estate from his grandfather, including major land holdings
in South Wales acquired through the 1st Marquess’s advantageous
marriage as well as substantial holdings in the funds.
In 1817 he began surveying the Glamorgan coal fields, consoli-
dating his local land holdings as he did so and building the Welsh
coal mining industry during the 1820s. Between 1822 and 1848, he
also developed the Cardiff Docks, opening the new Docks in 1837
at a cost of £350,000. His activity in both areas brought him huge
debts of £494,000 at his death, although his assets greatly exceeded
that value, and their profitability developed further, so that in the
1870s his grandson and heir was claimed (probably incorrectly,
given the rise of American fortunes by that stage) to be the richest
man in the world.
Between 1813 and 1822 the agricultural prosperity went into
reverse. While costs fell somewhat, with the deflation attendant on
returning to the gold standard in 1819–21, income from land fell
considerably further, and landowners who, unlike Bute, did not
have substantial outside holdings were sorely pressed. Their situa-
tion is well illustrated in an 1822 conversation between the diarist
Harriet Arbuthnot, the young (28) wife of Charles Arbuthnot, a
Treasury Secretary (junior minister) whose wealth was primarily in
Consols, and her older (62) cousin the 10th Earl of Westmorland,
Lord Privy Seal (a cabinet minister) and a large landowner:
I insisted that the cry of agricultural distress was grossly exag-
gerated, that the pressure felt by that class now was nothing
compared to that suffered by the manufacturing districts in
1819, when 10,000 able and willing workmen were starving in
one town (Glasgow) for want of work, and every other manu-
facturing town suffering in a like degree; that the farmers had
got into luxurious habits which they did not choose to give up
and therefore joined in the cry of “No Taxes;” that those
9This is largely consistent with the theoretical analysis of Ventura and Voth
(2015): landholders experienced wealth gains from their Consols that led them to
switch out of low-return agricultural investments, thereby lowering factor
demand in the old sectors and raising profitability in the new sectors.
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persons who had borrowed money at 5 per cent interest dur-
ing the war to buy land would suffer as any body did who bor-
rowed money to buy any thing; but that the great landed
proprietors would weather the storm and be just as well off as
ever; that there would certainly be a transfer of property, but
that the country generally would be as rich as ever and that
there could not be a greater proof of it than the enormous
increase of the Revenue in every branch. He said I talked non-
sense and was very childish (which, by the way, is no argument)
and that the transfer of property I talked of so quietly would be
a greater revolution than even a bankruptcy of the funds.10
Shares were a relatively insignificant store of wealth in post-1815
Britain, with total public share capital paid in of £49 million in 1827,
of which £34 million related to companies formed before 1824. The
624 companies floated in the bubble of 1824–25 had a nominal cap-
ital of £372million, but only £15.2million of this capital was ever paid
in; by 1827, when the dust settled, that had declined in value to
£9.3 million. Share prices in 1815–27 were not especially buoyant, in
spite of the bubble of 1824–25; on a quarterly average basis the share
index rose by only 61 percent, from 3.1 in the second quarter of 1815
(1962 W 100) to 5.0 at the peak in the third quarter of 1824. The
bubble thereafter deflated, with the index in the fourth quarter of
1825 being only 4.44, and 4.1 in the fourth quarter of 1827. Changes
in share wealth were clearly not economically significant during
these years.11
There was one final form of nonland wealth that underwent a
major boom in the early 1820s before collapsing in 1825–26: for-
eign bonds. In 1817–18 several European governments floated
bonds totaling £10 million, while in the boom of 1821–25 some
£43 million12 was invested in foreign bonds, of which £37 million
related to Latin American issues. These investments were a sub-
stantial absorber of British capital, especially during the
1822–25 period as declining yields on Consols caused investors to
10Bamford and Wellington (1950: vol. 1, 139), diary entry for February 2, 1822.
11Flotations in 1824–25: Stockbroker Henry English, quoted in Neal (1998: 64).
Share price index: Bank of England Statistics “Share Prices in the United
Kingdom” held in the St. Louis Fed.’s FRED database, accessed March 3, 2017.
12Figures quoted on foreign bond issues are from Neal (1998: 63) and the detail
is from Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953: vol. 1, 188–89).
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seek higher returns elsewhere. However, the profits and losses
involved do not appear to have been significant, except in the
immediate aftermath of the 1825–26 crash.
Who Were the Rentiers?
Information on the owners of Consols can first be gained by
examining the estates of the very wealthiest. Three died between
1809 and 1839 who are believed to have been Britain’s first
millionaires: (1) Nathan Rothschild (1836), worth £5 million,
whose fortune was largely in Consols and other liquid securities,
and who is known to have grown very much richer in the decade
after 1815; (2) the 1st Duke of Sutherland, formerly Marquess of
Stafford (1833), worth £2 million, whose fortune was largely in
land, but with substantial agricultural and industrial development
including the Bridgewater Canal; and (3) Sir Robert Peel (1830)
father of the future prime minister, worth £1.5 million, whose for-
tune was derived from the family cotton mill business that had
employed 15,000 people at its peak, but by his death consisted
largely of Consols, houses, and land.13
Lower down the scale it is notable that the five-year average of the
annual number of nonland fortunes above £100,000 among the
newly deceased took a sharp upward turn, from 16.5 in 1809–14 and
18.2 in 1815–19 to 25.6 in 1820–24, and 29.0 in 1825–29. It then did
not rise significantly further until after 1855 (Robinson 1985: 47).
Although Robinson could think of no explanation for this increase,
the jump’s coincidence with the recovery in Consols’ prices suggests
that Consols formed a high proportion of the wealth covered by these
statistics, which derive from probate valuations that do not include
real property and therefore relate primarily to mercantile rather than
aristocratic fortunes. At the same time, including land changes the
wealth picture considerably: more than 80 percent of people worth
more than £100,000 in 1825 were primarily landowners.
Of the nonlanded rich dying in the 1820s, a high proportion
were in the City of London, either as merchants, bankers, or in
insurance or stockbroking—15 of the 24 with nonland wealth from
£500,000 to £1 million died between 1820 and 1839. It can safely
be assumed that the great majority of these fortunes would have
13Data on these holdings of the very rich are contained in Robinson (1985).
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been held in Consols. Of the other nine, the three in textiles, the
one in publishing, and the two in public administration and defense
will also have held a high percentage of their nonland wealth in
Consols, since none of those occupations is capital intensive. Only
three of the 24, with principal occupations in iron/steel, chemicals,
and brewing may have held relatively small stocks of Consols, with
the majority of their nonland wealth in their primary businesses.
The same analysis carried out on the “lesser wealthy” who died
with nonlanded wealth between £100,000 and £500,000 in the
years 1809–29 shows a similar pattern: 117 of the 154 such people
either were merchants, worked in finance, were professionals, or
worked in public administration. Since these people had little need
for plant and equipment, the majority of their nonland wealth
would have been held in Consols.14
We can then conclude that the capital gains from the Consols’
price increase in 1815–24 had a major effect on the net worth of
nearly all those with substantial nonlanded wealth, many of whom
like Bute may also have had large landholdings.
In this context, the wealth accumulation patterns of early 19th
century industrialists, from Sir Robert Peel downward, should also
be borne in mind. There was no public equity market available to
raise money for industrial companies, and bank loans were not
available for long maturities except for a moderate proportion of
the value of buildings and land. Hence, businesses were built up
by collaboration between entrepreneurs through private partner-
ships, formed, and dissolved as needed.15
The members of those partnerships, once the initial investment
in plant had been made, kept substantial balances of liquid assets to
14Data on the occupations of the dying wealthy in these paragraphs come from
Robinson (1985: 82–87).
15Manufacturers themselves did not borrow for long-term plant investment, but
accumulated retained earnings and savings, much of them in Consols, which were
more secure than the local English banks. The brokers and embryonic “merchant
banks” did not invest directly in industry, but country banks lent to it, and would
have been encouraged to lend more by the Consols-driven increase in their capi-
tal. The capital gains accrued to small holders as well as large and gave manufac-
turers more capital with which to expand their own factories or invest in other
people’s. The holdings of Consols in manufacturing districts were also more signif-
icant for industrialization than those among the gentry, who had limited ability to
access industrial investment opportunities and tended like Mrs. Arbuthnot to buy
South American bond issues and shares, mostly in canals and early railways.
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meet the need for new investment and to protect the business
against downturns, which could be severe and unexpected.
Consols, utterly safe, highly liquid, and yielding a decent return
(and a superb return in 1815–24) were a favorite holding for such
people, who in the early 1820s found themselves through their
Consols’ holdings very much richer than before. It is then fair to
presume that Consols’ windfalls paid for much of the industrial
expansion in the 1820s and its accompanying capital intensification.
Economic Effects of Rentier Apotheosis
Britain’s economy in 1814 was already qualitatively different
from any other in the world, or from its own state 30 years earlier.
The French economist Jean-Baptiste Say visited Britain in late
1814, after the peace but before Napoleon’s return from Elba,
and set out his impressions in a pamphlet De l’Angleterre at des
Anglais:
But it is principally the introduction of machines in the arts,
which has made the production of riches more economical.
There are almost no big farms in England, where for exam-
ple, threshing machines are not used, by means of which, in
a large operation, more work is done in a day than was done
in a month by ordinary methods.
At last human labor, which has rendered the high cost of
consumer goods so expensive, is in no circumstances replaced
so advantageously, as by steam engines, improperly called
“fire-pumps” by some. There is no work which cannot be
reached to be executed by them. They go to the mills, weav-
ing cotton and wool; they brew beer, they cut crystals. I have
seen them embroider muslin and beat butter. At Newcastle,
at Leeds, I have seen moving steam engines dragging after
them carts of coal; and nothing is more surprising, at first
sight, for a traveler, than to meet in the country long convoys
which advance by themselves and without the help of any
living being.
Everywhere steam engines are prodigiously multiplied.
There were no more than two or three in London thirty years
ago, there are thousands at present. There are hundreds of
them in the large manufacturing towns; one sees them even
in the countryside, and industrial works could not be sus-
tained profitably without their powerful help. But they must
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have abundant coal, that combustible fossil which Nature
seems to have reserved to supplement the exhaustion of
forests, the inevitable result of civilization. Thus one could,
with the help of a simple mineralogical map, trace an indus-
trial map of Britain. There is industry everywhere there is
coal in the ground [Say 1815: 29–31].16
Say also noted that high British taxation and the gigantic govern-
ment debt were of immense importance in raising the cost of
everything in Britain and depressing the profits of business and
commerce. He believed British goods would be uncompetitive in
Europe once the European economies had recovered from the
war. Writing while Consols’ prices were still depressed, Say failed
to foresee the effect of their subsequent rise. Liverpool however
foresaw that effect in the following year, during the postwar eco-
nomic downturn. Writing to George Canning on February 13,
1816, and discussing the clamor to abolish the income and malt
taxes (which in the event succeeded) he wrote, “I am satisfied like-
wise that those who raise this clamour have a narrow view of their
own interest, as the restoration of public credit, the run of the
funds, and the consequent fall of the interest on money will afford
more relief to the existing distress of the country than any other
measure of relief that could be adopted.”17
Table 4 sets out U.K. (including Ireland) population, GDP, and
GDP per capita figures for 1801–41, at 10-year intervals, with five-
year additions for 1816 and 1826. The GDP figures are of course
a backward extrapolation of a statistic (and a questionable one at
that!) that was only invented a century later, but for what they are
worth they show a distinct acceleration in growth of per capita
GDP, from 2.16 percent per annum to 3.11 percent per annum
between the decades 1811–21 and 1821–31. Note also that, with
population expanding at a very rapid rate of around 1.3 percent
annually, the 1820s growth rates are spectacular even by modern
standards, indeed considerably higher than was to be achieved in
any subsequent decade.
16Martin Hutchinson’s translation.
17Quoted in Yonge (1868: vol 2: 253–55). The italics are ours, and we take “the
run of the funds” to be a direct reference to the price rise to be expected as pub-
lic credit recovered.
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Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz use brick production as a measure
of economic activity in capital goods; this increased from an annual
average of 791.2 million in 1815–18 to 992.4 million in 1819–22 to
1,501.7 million in 1823–26; the 1825 figure of 1,948.8 million was
the highest in any year before 1846 (Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz
1953: 121, 147, 186).
Other indicators show a similar picture of economic accelera-
tion after 1820. Coal shipments from Newcastle and Sunderland
rose from an annual average of 1,083 thousand chaldrons in
1814–19 to 1,249 thousand chaldrons in 1820–26 (Mitchell 2011:
243).18 Pig iron production rose from an annual average of
305 thousand tons in 1814–19 to an annual average of 453 thou-
sand tons in 1820–26 (Mitchell 2011: 280). Raw cotton consump-
tion rose from an annual average of 96 million pounds in 1814–19
to an annual average of 147 million pounds in 1820–26 (ibid., 332).
Manufactured goods exports at constant prices, mostly textiles,
rose from £15.3 million in 1814–19 to £17.9 million in 1820–26
(ibid., 520).
18The chaldron was a volume measure used for coal. By a law of 1694, the
Newcastle chaldron of coal was defined to weigh 5,940 pounds.
TABLE 4
British Real per capita GDP Growth Rate, 1801–41
Annual real
Nominal Price Real GDP Real per per capita
GDP Level (millions Population capita GDP GDP
(£m) (1826 W 100) of 1826 £s) (thousands) (1826 £s) Growth (%)
1801 257 155.7 165.1 16,300 10.1 —
1811 334 145.4 229.7 18,500 12.4 2.06
1816 328 118.6 276.6 19,700 14.0 2.49
1821 322 99.7 323.0 21,000 15.4 1.84
1826 403 100.0 403.0 22,500 17.9 3.09
1831 480 95.3 503.7 24,100 20.9 3.13
1841 520 97.7 532.2 26,900 19.8 ^0.55
Sources: For GDP, www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/year_spending_1841UKmn
_16mc1n#ukgs302; for population and prices, Mitchell (2011: 11, 721).
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The Hoffman index of industrial production rose from an aver-
age of 9.39 in 1815–18 to 10.67 in 1819–22 and then to 12.28 in
1823–26 (ibid., 431). Perhaps most significantly, the annual aver-
age number of English patents granted fell slightly from 114 in
1815–18 to 105 in 1819–22, but then soared to 177 in 1823–26—
surely a sign of entrepreneurial activity in those years, though it
fell back to 153 in 1827–30 (ibid., 438).
Thus, the overall real return to Consols’ investors over the
period 1813–24 was in excess of 300 percent. If they held on and
reinvested income during that period, Consols holders quadrupled
their money in real terms.
The mechanism by which British economic growth benefitted
from the 1815–24 rise in Consols’ prices is well set out in Gayer,
Rostow, and Schwartz (1953: vol. 1, 185):
The character of the (1822–26) cycle as a whole, however, can
be distinguished from earlier cycles by the scale and the
scope of new private investment. There was an increase in
railways construction, new docks were built, and what
appears to be the greatest building boom until the forties took
place. Gas-light, insurance, building, trading, investment,
provision companies, in addition to many others, were
formed on a large scale. These, the fluctuations of foreign
government and mining issues and the fabulous Stock
Exchange boom and crash (1824–25) impart to these years
their unique character.
The economics is clear. For the British economy to industrial-
ize, its capital intensity had to increase. This increase accelerated
in the decade after Waterloo, and Consols’ profits provided wealth
enabling this increase to take place more quickly, more smoothly
and with less pressure on workers’ living standards than would oth-
erwise have occurred.19
19There is a good counterexample in the 1831–46 period that supports our main
thesis, a decade without significant Consols’ profits but with the massive capital
needs for the railways. During this period, the economy underwent the “Engels
pause” without rising living standards, as manufacturing was starved for capital.
Engels believed living standards would never rise and had never risen. He was
wrong but writing in 1844, after a decade of stagnant real wages and the 1820s
ebullience had been forgotten. Our point is that, without the Consols’ profit, new
capital needs for the industrializing and capital-intensifying economy were hard
to come by, and could only be gotten slowly by the workers being squeezed.
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Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953: vol. 1, 185) blame the
excess speculation in 1824–25 on two additional factors, both of
which seem pertinent. First, in April 1822, the government had
extended the privilege of country banks issuing £1 and £2 notes,
which had the effect of an unexpected increase in the money sup-
ply. Second, the double refinancing of 5 percent and 4 percent
Consols in 1823–24 produced “a restless feeling and a disposition
to hazardous investment,”20 and a surge in foreign bond
purchases.
The extent of the speculative fervor was spelled out by a contem-
porary stockbroker, Henry English, and his analysis has remained
authoritative to this day.21 Briefly, English listed 624 companies
that were floated in the years 1824 and 1825. They had a capitaliza-
tion of £372,173,100. By 1827, only 127 of these existed with a cap-
italization of £102,781,600, of which only £15,185,950 had been
paid in; but the market value had sunk even lower to only
£9,303,950. Of the 127 still existing in 1827, 44 were mining com-
panies (mostly in Latin America), 20 gas companies, 14 insurance,
and 49 miscellaneous, including salt, silk, lard, bridge, emigration,
glass distilling, brick, bank, and agricultural companies.
In addition, 15 railway companies were formed by Acts of
Parliament in 1823–26, for a total projected construction cost of
£3.64 million, of which the Stockton and Darlington, authorized in
1823 at a cost of £450,000 and opened in 1825, and the Liverpool
and Manchester, authorized in 1826 at the immense construction
cost of £1,832,375, more than all the rest put together, and opened
in 1830 in the presence of the Duke of Wellington, are the most
famous. The experimental and dangerous nature of this technology
is indicated by the fact that the Stockton and Darlington used
steam trains only for goods traffic, with passengers being drawn by
horse carriages until 1833, while the Liverpool and Manchester
accidently knocked over and killed the former Cabinet Minister
William Huskisson at its opening on September 15, 1830.
Mrs. Arbuthnot was a keen observer of the stock market bubble
of 1825, which she discussed in detail with Wellington, who
thought it would all end in a crash (as did Liverpool, who said so
20Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz (1953) quoting Tooke (1838).
21“A Complete View of the Joint Stock Companies Formed during the Years
1824 and 1825,” Henry English, 1827, quoted in Neal (1998: 64).
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in the House of Lords). However, she could not resist a good spec-
ulation herself:
There is a railway going to be made between Liverpool and
Manchester which promises to answer immensely. We have
10 shares in it for which we gave £3 a piece and which are
now worth above £58 each and they are expected to be worth
above £100. I am very fond of these speculations and should
gamble greatly in them if I could, but Mr. Arbuthnot does not
like them, and will not allow me to have any of the American
ones as their value depends on political events and he thinks
in his official situation it would be improper [Bamford and
Wellington 1950: vol. 1, 382].
Improper or not, Mrs. Arbuthnot got in on the ground floor. Her
diary entry was dated March 16, 1825, and the Liverpool and
Manchester Railway Company had been formed in 1823. However,
its first attempt to get Parliamentary authorization in 1825 failed
(largely through opposition by theMarquess of Stafford, owner of the
competing Bridgewater Canal), and it gained authorization only at a
second attempt in May 1826.
Since Arbuthnot had been what today would be called the gov-
ernment’s Chief Whip in the House of Commons (though he had
given up that job in 1823 while remaining a junior minister as
Commissioner for Woods and Forests) his 10 shares (of an even-
tual total of 4,233, spread among 308 shareholders, with Stafford
eventually owning 1,000) may have been a special allocation. It was
however not quite the handout it appears. Following corporate
finance practices of the time, the shares will have been partly paid,
with say £10 paid on a £100 share, and Arbuthnot will have been
called for the other £90 when Parliament had approved the com-
pany and construction began. While £900 was affordable for the
comfortably off Arbuthnots, larger sums would not have been, so
Arbuthnot was right to stop his wife punting on South American
mining companies. Nevertheless, their Liverpool and Manchester
Railway investment was a successful one, if they kept it; the com-
pany paid an average dividend of 9.5 percent in its 15 years as an
independent company.
Since the Bubble Act, requiring an Act of Parliament to form a
new company, was not repealed until 1826, much of the new
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investment in 1822–25 was informal and small-scale, in start-ups
and other kinds of experimentation. The surge in patents granted
in 1823–26 itself confirms that the surge in Consols’ wealth
allowed exploration of projects that were not immediately prof-
itable. One such project, far more famous in 2017 than it was at the
time, was that carried out by Charles Babbage.
Babbage was a typical beneficiary of the surge in Consols’
prices. His father was a partner in the banking house of Praed &
Co., whose wealth, like that of most bankers, will have been sub-
stantially augmented by the rise in Consols. Babbage was partly
supported by his father and inherited a fortune of £100,000 when
his father died in 1827. However, the initial funding for his differ-
ence engine project came not from his father but from Liverpool’s
government, which made a grant to Babbage of £1,700 in 1823 to
start work on the project. Alas, endless redesigns meant the proto-
type was never finished, and the government, under the unimagi-
native Sir Robert Peel (son of the textile millionaire) canceled
further funding for the project in 1842 after it had absorbed
£17,000 of public money.
In spite of Babbage’s failure, the statistics show that the pace of
innovation, industrialization, and Britain’s overall economic growth
quickened substantially in the early and middle 1820s, and that the
new wealth produced by the return of Consols’ prices to peacetime
levels substantially contributed to this quickening. Britain’s industrial
lead established during this period was not to be relinquished until
the last quarter of the century.
Conclusion
The rise in Consols’ prices in 1815–24, under the able economic
management of Lord Liverpool created not the “euthanasia of the
rentier” of Maynard Keynes’ leftist fantasies but his apotheosis, in
which, combining the rise in Consols and given the decline in prices
that accompanied the return to gold, rentier nonland wealth nearly
quadrupled in real terms during Liverpool’s premiership. That
increase in wealth coincided with and likely produced a surge in cap-
ital investment and innovation, which, apart from the follies of the
Latin American bond market, produced the first great surge of the
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